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Race, Reason, and Representation
Tayyab Mahmud"
Liberalism andEmpire: A Study in Nineteenth-CenturyBritish Liberal
Thought. By Uday Singh Mehta.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1999. Pp. 237. $45.00.

"[A]ll men are created equal," proclaimed the drafters of the
American Declaration of Independence while taking slavery for
granted.' Champions of the French Revolution deemed Haitian
Blacks and Creoles not worthy of liberty, equality and fraternity.2
Liberalism, which claims universality and prides itself for its politically inclusionary character, furnished justifications for European
tutelage of colonial subjects. 3 Britain, following the reform bills of
the nineteenth century, in its self-image was a democracy, yet it
held a vast empire that was undemocratic in its acquisition and
governance.4 Following Locke, exercise of political power was
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University. I would like to thank Sheldon Gelman and Ratna Kapur for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. Any remaining errors are, of course, my own.
' See generally JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS

JEFFERSON (1997) (discussing Jefferson's views on slavery); PAUL FINKLEMAN, SLAVERY AND
THE FRAMERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON (1996); EDUMND S. MORGAN,
AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1975) (describing paradoxical relationship between notions of slavery and freedom in colonial Virginia).
See generally CAROLYN E. FICK, THE MAKING OF HAITI: THE SAINT DOMINGUE
REVOLUTION FROM BELOW (1990) (describing Haitians' slave revolt against France that
began in 1791 and ended in independence in 1804); C.L.R. JAMES, THE BLACKJACOBINS:
TOUSSAINT L'OUVERTURE AND THE SAN DOMINGO REVOLUTION (2d ed. 1963) (presenting
historical background of Haiti).

See, e.g., Bhikhu Parekh, SuperiorPeople: The Narrowness ofLiberalismfrom Mill to Rawls,
TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Feb. 25 1994, at 11.
' The nineteenth-century Reform Bills included laws extending education, creating a
competitive civil service examination, broadening House of Commons representation, re-

forming child labor laws and the Poor Law system, centralizing such governmental activities
as road construction and adopting a freer trade policy by reducing protective tariffs. The
Judicature Acts 1873 and the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 streamlined the judicial system,
professionalized legal practice and hastened the fusion of law and equity. SeeJ.H. BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY (3d ed. .1990); A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO
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deemed linked with rights of citizens, and yet in the colonies power
was overwhelmingly exercised over subjects rather than citizens.
Liberals recognized good government as intimately linked with
self-government, and yet repudiated this linkage in the colonies.
These anomalies of modern history have vexed many as they
raise intriguing questions about the past, present and future of
modernity's promise of freedom, autonomy and dignity for all.
Author E. P. Thompson succinctly articulated the question: how
did ideas of equality, liberty and fraternity lead to empire, liberticide, and fracticide? What is the source of the disjunction between the theory of liberalism and its history? Is the gulf between
the two inevitable or incidental? Is it rooted in epistemological
posture of modern thought, theoretical lacunas of liberalism or
theorists' visions distorted by the racism of their milieu? Uday
Singh Mehta's Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century
British Liberal Thought is a timely and thoughtful attempt to examine these questions.6
Mehta's project is to examine British liberal thought in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries "by viewing it through the
mirror that reflects its association with the British Empire."7 He
wants to understand how liberal theorists "responded to parts of
the world with which they were largely unfamiliar but which also
intensely preoccupied them."8 The derivative query that informs
the book is "the liberal justification of the empire. "9 An accomTHE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (E.C.S. Wade ed., 10th ed. 1958).

Many

scholars have provided useful accounts of British colonial expansion. See CA. BAYLY,
IMPERIAL MERIDIAN: THE BRrrISH EMPIRE AND THE WORLD, 1780-1830 (1989); P.J. CAIN &
A.G. HOPKINS, 1 BRITISH IMPERIALISM 1688-1914 (1993); FRANCIS HUTCHINS, ILLUSION OF
BRITISH IMPERIALISM IN INDIA (1967); P.J. MARSHALL, A FREE THOUGH
CONQUERING PEOPLE: BRITAIN AND ASIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1968).
5 See E.P. THOMPSON, THE ROMANTICS: ENGLAND IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE 65-66
PERMANENCE:

(1997). Other authors have provided useful studies of the evolution and content of liberalism. See, e.g., GUIDO DE RUGGIERO, THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN LIBERALISM (R.G. Coilingwood trans., 1927); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); ERNEST GELLNER,
CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY: CIL SOCIETY AND ITS RIVALS (1994); HAROLDJ. LASKI, THE RISE OF
EUROPEAN LIBERALISM (Transaction Publishers 1997) (1936); ROBERT NozIcK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); KARL K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (1945);
JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); MICHAEL SANSEL, LIBERALISM AND THE

LIMITS OFJUSTICE (1982).
6 See UDAY SINGH MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE: A STUDY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
BRITISH LIBERAL THOUGHT (1999) [hereinafter MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE].
7 Id. at 1.
8

Id.

Id. at 2. Other studies examine the relationship between utilitarianism and British
colonialism of India. See, e.g., THOMAS R. METCALF, THE NEW CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF INDIA:
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plished scholar of liberal thought, '° Mehta explores why liberals
endorsed empire as a legitimate form of political governance, justified its undemocratic and nonrepresentative structure, invoked
categories of history, civilizational hierarchies, and race and blood
to fashion arguments for the empire's necessity and prolongation.
Furthermore, Mehta wants to contrast this with the posture of
Edmund Burke, by common acknowledgement a leading modern
conservative, who retained a sustained skepticism towards colonial
rule and voiced moral and political indignation against injustices,
cruelty, caprice, and exploitation of empire. Mehta subscribes to
Harold Laski's view that on "Ireland, America, and India [Burke]
was at every point upon the side of the future" and that "he was the
first English statesman to fully understand the moral import of the
problem of subject races."
Liberal justifications of colonial subjugation are ironic given the
foundations of liberal thought. Liberalism professes an abiding
commitment to securing individual liberty and human dignity
through a political cast that typically involves democratic and representative institutions, the guaranty of individual rights of property, the freedom of expression, association, and conscience, all of
which are taken to limit the authority of the state. But the liberal
involvement with the British Empire is broadly coeval with liberalism itself. This leads Mehta to explore the chronological correspondence in the development of liberal thought and empire, and
the clear though complex link between the ideas that are central to
liberalism and those that undergirded practices of imperialism.
Mehta's method is to examine the writings of a small though
significant group of liberal political thinkers as they reflected on
British rule in India, viewing the latter as "the promised land of
liberal ideas - a kind of test case laboratory." 2 Importantly, Mehta
insists that the claims he makes about liberalism are "integral to its
political vision and not peculiar amendments or modifications im(1994); ERIc S. STOKES, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS AND INDIA
(1959); Raghavan Iyer, Utilitarianismand Empire in India, in MODERN INDIA: AN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHOLOGY (Thomas Metcalf ed., 1971).
IDEOLOGIES OF THE RAJ

'0 See, e.g., UDAY SINGH MEHTA, THE ANXIETY OF FREEDOM: IMAGINATION AND
INDIDUALITY IN LOCKE'S POLITICAL THOUGHT (1992); Uday S. Mehta, Liberal Strategies of
Exclusion, in TENSIONS OF EMPIRE: COLONIAL CULTURES IN A BOURGEOIS WORLD 59 (Freder-

ick Cooper & Ann Laura Stoler eds., 1997).

11 HAROLD J. LASKI, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN ENGLAND FROM LOCKE TO BENTHAM 149,

153 (1950).
2

MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE, supra note6, at 9.
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posed on it by the attention to India." 3 His primary motivation is
to study "how liberal theorists responded to the challenge of a
world marked by unmistakably different ways of organizing social
and political life, molding and expressing individuality and freedom: in a word, an unfamiliar world marked by different ways of
being in it.' 4 Mehta argues that the primary factor conditioning
the liberal response to empire was "the awareness of the inequality
of power." 5 Furthermore, he discerns a two-fold effect of this
background condition.
On the one hand, it gives to liberal
thought about India "an assertive expansiveness, a confidence of
judgment, an unqualified energy, and often an acute sense of urgency and mission." 6 On the other, it "lends to the disagreements
diswithin British thoughts on India a tone of doubt, dilemmatic
'7
,
comfort, and heightened and contentious acrimony.
Mehta finds the inequality of power implicated in the question
of race, a question he notes is "conspicuous in its absence"' 8 in British liberals' writings on India. The surprising exception is John
Stuart Mill, who elaborates the term through the biological notion
of "blood," and draws what he takes to be the crucial distinction in
terms of readiness for representative institutions by reference to
"of [our] own blood" and those not of our blood.' 9 Mehta wonders
if the relative absence of race in this discourse is symptomatic of a
deeper denial, that of not wishing to acknowledge the unfamiliar,
or whether for the liberals "race is a visible mark of the unfamiliar,
so that to allow it to stand for that alterity and the plethora of differences that lie behind it might limit the very constructive enterprise through which it can be molded to become, or at least appear, familiar." 20
This is where imperial pedagogy comes in,
whereby race "operates in the malleable and concealed space be" Id. at 9.
14 Id. at ll.
15

1
7
IS

Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 15.

' John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, in JOHN STUART MILL,
THREE ESSAYS 402 (1975) (1861). Several perceptive studies examine Mill's positions about
colonialism. See, e.g., Eileen P. Sullivan, Liberalism and Imperialism:John Stuart Mill's Defense of
the British Empire, 44J. HIST. IDEAS 599 (1983); R.J. Moore, John Stuart Mill at the East India
Home, 20 HIST. STUD. 497 (1983); Lynn Barry Zastoupil, John Stuart Mill and the British
Empire: An Intellectual Biography (1985) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Minnesota) (on file with author).
MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE, supranote 6, at 15.
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hind the starkness of blood and color to reproduce the familiar,
even if somatically refracted, category of being English. 21 Mehta
notes here Macaulay's agenda for colonial education targeted at
producing a "class of persons, Indian in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect. 2 2 Entry into
representative politics, thus, is not open to all, with race deemed a
mark of eligibility and lesser races obligated to undergo a process
of tutelage by the higher race in order to acquire the requisite certifications of eligibility.
Mehta also locates the issue of power in the very stance and the
point of view that particular ideas assume with respect to other
ideas and forms of life. This he sees not as a matter of choice but
determined by epistemological foundations of any particular set of
ideas. He locates the liberal gaze in a judgmental rationality
whereby the strange and the unfamiliar have meaning only within
the general structure of what it would mean for facts to hang together rationally, and by their placement along the presumed linear trajectory of history.
For Mehta, " [I] iberal imperialism is impossible without this epistemological commitment - which by the nineteenth century supports both the paternalism and progressivism - that is, the main
theoretical justifications - of the empire." 23 Rooted in Western
philosophical tradition's posture towards correspondence between
language and objects, the conditions for intelligibility forwarded by
rationality render the singular intelligible only by reference to the
general. This is predicated on the assumption that the strange is
just a variation of what is already familiar, because both the familiar
and the strange are deemed to be merely specific instances of a
familiar structure of generality.
Highlighting the inextricable linkage between knowledge and
power, Mehta argues that "the epistemological perspective that
articulates that structure also undergirds an elaborate vision of how
"

Id.

THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, Minute on Indian Education, in SELECTED WRITINGS
237, 249 (John Clive & Thomas Piney eds., 1972); see alsoJOSEPH HAMBURGER, MACAULAY
AND THE WHIG TRADITION (1976) (describing relationship of Macaulay with English political

thought). For a perceptive study of the connection between colonialism and colonial education policies, see GAURI VISWANATHAN, MASKS OF CONQUEST: LITERARY STUDY AND BRITISH

RULE IN INDIA (1989), Peter Robb, British Rule and Indian "Improvement,"34 ECON. HiST. REV.
507 (1981), and Gerald Sirkin & Natalie Robinson Sirkin, The Battle of Indian Education:
Macaulay's OpeningSalvo Newly Discovered, 14 VICTORIAN STUD. 407 (1971).
MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 18.
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politically to assimilate things, even when those things are
thoroughly unfamiliar."2 4 This he terms "the cosmopolitanism of
reason."25 When faced with the unfamiliar, then, liberals can do no
more than repeat and assert the familiar structures of generalities,
which "in a single glance and without having experienced any of it,..
. make it possible to compare and classify the world. ", 26 Mehta finds
in this glance the urge to dominate the world because "the
language of those comparisons is not neutral and cannot avoid'
notions of superiority and inferiority, backward and progressive,
and higher and lower." 27 As some liberals did resist this urge,
Mehta's claim is not "that
liberalism must be imperialistic, only that
28
the urge is internalto it."

For Mehta, what is denied in the rational assertions of familiarity
of the unfamiliar is the archaic, the premodern, the religious,
along with sentiments, feelings, sense of location, and forms of life
of which they are a part. Here, again, he finds Burke's posture a
salutary one, not because he has a more realistic epistemology, but
rather because his thought is pitched at a level that takes seriously
the sentiments, feelings, and attachments through which peoples
are, and aspire to be, at home. This posture of thought acknowledges that the integrity of experience is tied to its locality and
Burke does not presume to understand the unfamiliar simply on
account of his being rational, modern, or British.
This openness to the possibility that the unfamiliar may remain
unfamiliar, Mehta finds undergirded by humility. He argues that
Burke "shatters the philosophical underpinnings of the project of
the empire by making it no more than a conversation between two
strangers."2
This Mehta terms "the cosmopolitanism of senti3
°
ments." It holds out the possibility of wider bonds of sympathy
and understanding of sentiments through an open-ended conversation, not guided by any authorizing regime of reason or teleology. In this acknowledgement of the unfamiliar remaining so,

Id. at 20.
n Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
21
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Mehta discerns "the possibility of31 mutual understanding, mutual
influence, and mutual recognition.
In the liberal discourse on empire, Mehta discerns pervasive deployment of the metaphor of childhood as a fixed point underlying
the various imperial projects of education, governance and progress. Indians, for example, are characterized as being in the infancy of the "'progress of civilization,' 32 necessitating that the British rule like fathers who are "'just and unjust, moderate and rapacious,'

3

3

as a means of "gradually training the people to walk

alone," 34 and

enabling them to "grow to man's estate."35 For liberals, then, Indians are children for whom the empire offers the
prospect of legitimate and progressive parentage and towards
which Britain, as a parent, is similarly obligated and competent.3
This point is the basis for the justification of denying democratic
rights and representative institutions to Indians.
Mehta traces the pedigree of this idea in the liberal tradition that
originates in Locke's characterization of tutelage as a necessary
stage through which children must be trained before they can acquire the reason requisite for expressing contractual consent. Mehta focuses on the exclusionary effect of the distinction between
universal anthropological capacities and the necessary conditions
for their political actualization posited by liberalism. He sees the
exclusionary basis of liberalism "deriv[ing] from its theoretical core
. . . because behind the capacities ascribed to all human beings
exists a thicker set of social credentials that constitute the real
bases of political inclusion." 7 Liberalism claims to be transhistorical, transcultural, and transracial. The universality claims
rest on certain minimal anthropological characteristics posited as
being common to all human beings. Central among these are that
everyone is naturally free, that all are, in the relevant moral respects, equal, and finally that they are rational. Not only are all, by
3'

Id. at 23.

3'

Id. at 31 (quotingJames Mill's multi-volume The History of British India).
Id. (quoting Thomas B. Macaulay, Warren Hastings, in CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL

ESSAYS 86 (1903)).
"
SeeMill, supra note 19, at 175-76.
itCHARLES E. TREVELYAN, ON THE EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE OF INDIA 187 (London,

Longman Orme, Brown, Green & Longmans 1838).
' See Asis Nandy, Reconstructing Childhood: A Critique of the Ideology of Adulthood, in
TRADITIONS, TYRANNY, AND UTOPIAS: ESSAYS IN THE POLITICS OF AWARENESS (1987) (providing insightful discussion of concept of childhood in colonial context).
37 MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 48-49.
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their natures, perfectly free, this condition itself allows each to give
to one's persons, one's possessions, and one's actions strikingly
extreme expressions. It is this individual that becomes the subject
of the contractual agreement from which liberal political institutions derive.
This elaboration of the natural condition by Locke provokes an
obvious question: what ensures that this condition of perfect freedom will not result in a state of license and anarchy? Locke's classic answer is the bounds of the law of nature, accessible through
natural human reason. Mehta argues that Locke's minimalist anthropology, while serving as the foundation of his institutional
claims, also exposes the vulnerability of those institutions because
"the potentialities of the Lockean individual reside as a constant
internal threat to the regularities requisite for Lockean institutions."'" This necessitates mechanisms to ensure constancy and
moderation in the expression of interests and desires of the citizens of the commonwealth. The means of doing so are positing
conditions of political inclusion.
While C. B. Macperson and Carol Pateman rest their well-known
arguments of political exclusions in Locke on the revealing silences
of his texts, Mehta builds his case on the very language of those
texts. Here, Locke's views on children are deemed critical. Along
with lunatics and idiots, children are explicitly and unambiguously
excluded from Lockean consensual politics. For Locke, consent is
the fundamental ground for the legitimacy of political authority.
Consent requires acting in view of certain constraints that Locke
broadly designates as the laws of nature. To know these laws requires reason. Those who are unable to exercise reason either
permanently (e.g., madmen) or temporarily (e.g., children) do not
meet a necessary requisite for the expression of consent. By implication, therefore, they are excluded from the political constituency, or what amounts to the same thing, to be governed without
their consent. Political inclusion is thus contingent upon a qualified capacity to reason.

Id. at 55.
See generally C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM:
HOBBES AND LOCKE 194-262 (1962) (discussing Locke's political theory of appropriation);
CAROL PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 52-55 (1988) (describing how Locke and other

social contract theorists maintain silence about "sexual contract").
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What then is involved in developing the requisite capacities and
credentials to be able to reason? Mehta focuses on Locke's answer
detailed in Thoughts ConcerningEducation 0 Here, Locke suspends
the anthropological guarantee that natural human reason gives us
a preconventional access to the precepts of natural law. Instead,
the emphasis is wholly on the precise and detailed processes
through which this rationality must get inculcated. Capacity to
reason becomes a question of breeding an understanding of social
and hierarchical distinctions. Education becomes an initiation
into the enormously significant specifications of time, place and
social status. Of course, "a Prince, a Nobleman and an ordinary
Gentleman's son, should have different ways of breeding,"41 so they
learn Christianity, the laws of England, obedience, respect for
property and "civility in their language .

.

. towards their inferiors

and the meaner sort of people, particularly servants. 42 Mehta finds
that the terms Locke uses and norms he advocates "draw on and
encourage conceptions of human beings that are far from abstract
and universal, and in which the anthropological minimum is buried under a thick set of social inscriptions and signals."4 3 The actual subject of Lockean politics turns out to be propertied, white,
Christian and male.
Mehta then moves to uncover strategies of exclusion deployed by
liberals to exclude Indian colonial subjects from the primary promise of liberalism, representative government. The first, exemplified
by James Mill, is the maneuver to characterize India as impenetrable, resistant to logical inquiry and inscrutable. For Mehta, the
distinction between something that resists comprehension and
something that is inscrutable is critical. The former description
permits of a future change in which the object may, finally, become
comprehensible. It also places the onus on the comprehending
subject and not on the studied object. It suggests a limitation on
one's knowledge without predicating this on any essentiality of the
object.
In contrast, inscrutability designates an unfathomable limit to
the object of inquiry without implicating either the process of in.

JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION (Cambridge Univ. Press

1934) (1693).
"

Id. at 187.
Id. at 102.

"

MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 63.

"
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quiry or the inquirer. Here the object is made to appear on its own
reckoning as something that defies description and, hence, reception. Inscrutability places a limit on political possibilities by closing
off the prospect that the object satisfies the conditions requisite for
political inclusion. Lacking in Locke's reason, or, for that matter,
Rawl's reasonableness,44 the inscrutable stands akin to inanimate
objects that Hobbes claimed must be represented
45 precisely because
they cannot give authority on their own behalf.

If the exclusionary effect of inscrutability is achieved by the
crude descriptive fiat in refusing to engage in the particulars of
India, the next strategy Mehta explores represents an almost total
reversal. This involves delving into the arcane details of India's
ancient theological, cultural and historical particulars, and
through them, exposing the deficiencies of Indian political and
psychological endowments. Here, the universal anthropological
minimum yields to a complex set of individual and social indexes
as the prerequisites of political inclusion. Mehta terms this "the
strategy of civilizational infantilism."4
To ground his argument, Mehta examines the writings of John
Stuart Mill, and finds his chapter on "The Government of Dependencies
by a Free State," "a revealing document on the increasing relevance
of cultural, civilizational, linguistic, and racial categories in defining the constituency of Mill's liberalism. 4 7 Mill divides colonized
countries into two classes. The first is composed of countries "of
similar civilization to the ruling country; capable of, and ripe for,
representative government: such as the British possessions in
America and Australia."4 The other class includes "others, like
India, [that] are still at a great distance from that state."4 9 Mill

finds the practice of English colonialism towards those who "were
of her [England's] own blood and language" variously "vicious,"
economically ill advised, and a betrayal of a "fixed principle . . .
professed in theory" regarding free and democratic governance.5O
Regarding the second class of countries - countries whose race,
language and culture were different from the British - Mill's rec-

46

SeeJohn Rawls, Kantian Constructivism inMoral Theory, 77J. PHIL.515, 525-28 (1980).
SeeTHOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 217-22 (Viking Penguin 1968) (1651).
MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 69-70.

47 Id. at 70.

m Mill, supra note 19, at 402.
49

Id.

Id. at 402-03.
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ommendations are strikingly different. Not only is he opposed to
dismantling colonialism, he strongly recommends that colonial
rule be authoritarian. Absolute rule "guaranteed by irresistible
force.., is the ideal rule of a free people over a barbarous or semibarbarous one."' To govern a people different from one's self
only allows for "a choice of despotisms, " 2 precluding the possibility
of representative governance.
As for the principle of liberty, for Mill "[i] t is, perhaps, hardly
necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human
beings in the maturity of their faculties."53 The group of such human beings excludes not only children but also "those backward
states of societies in which the race itself may be considered as in its
nonage."54 Having classified human beings in immutably distinct
hierarchical categories, Mill is constrained to acknowledge that he
had "ceased to consider representative democracy as an absolute
and regarded it as a question of time, place, and circumprinciple,
55
stance."

For classical liberalism, then, political institutions such as representative democracy are dependent on society having reached a
particular historical maturation or level of civilization. But such
maturation is seen as differentially achieved. Hence those societies
in which higher accomplishments of civilization have not occurred
do not satisfy the conditions for representative government. Under such conditions liberalism in the form of empire services the
deficiencies of the past for societies that have been stunted
through history. This is the kernel of liberal justifications for empire. Mehta likens empire validated by liberalism to "an engine
that tows societies stalled in their past into contemporary time and
history. "56 And this reading of progress and history "derives cenappropriate yardstick for
trally from premises about reason as the
"
51
judging individual and collective lives.
For Mehta, "[t]he central axis on which nineteenth-century liberal justifications of the empire operate is time, and its cognate,
Id. at 409.

"
51
53

Id. at 410.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in JOHN STEWART MILL, THREE ESSAYS, supra note 19, at

57

JOHN STUART MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 120 (Columbia Univ. Press 1924) (1873).
MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 82.
Id.

15.
Id.

University of California,Davis
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patience." 58 Rooted in global orientation of modern European
historiography, nineteenth century liberals saw politics and history
as only different aspects of the same study. Backwardness gets
coded as a remnant of the past, a temporal deficit, which can be
remedied by political intervention turning colonizers' present into
the natives' future. While this past and future are the sources of
liberalism's colonial agenda of reform, they limit the ability of the
liberals to understand unfamiliar life forms. Mehta argues that
"the contemporaneity of these unfamiliar life forms cannot be spoken of in the register of historical time, for that register translates
them into the linearity of backwardness and thus immediately conceives of them in terms of an already known future."59 Extant
forms of living are then taken as only provisional and experience of
these forms is either exoticized or denied.
The discourse of a progressive history and the notion of a single
and continuous time "naturalizes what in fact were often aggressive
and violent efforts to suppress multiple and extant temporalities
and corresponding life forms." ° This vision of history and time
also forces liberalism in its colonial career to jettison its commitment to the primacy of the individual. The colonized subject is
spoken for by the society of which she is a member, and that society is spoken for by the historiography that determined the stage of
development that society is deemed to have achieved. 6
Mehta then examines liberal positions towards territorial space
as a clue to its complicity with empire. He first notes that liberal
thought seldom gives theoretical attention to the monumental spatial size of empire. He finds that theoretical assumptions of liberalism do not readily comport with the considerations that give territory its political salience. Mehta finds Locke's theory of private
property resting on two claims: first, that nature in itself is all but
worthless, and second, that individual labor is the source of value.
For Locke, even though the earth was given and held in common,
Id. at 106.
Id. at 108.
E

Id. at 109.

The relationship of modern theories of history with colonialism and modem con-

structions of race has been the basis of insightful analyses.

See, e.g., MICHEL ROLPH

TROUILLOT, SILENCING THE PAST: POWER AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORY (1995); ROBERT
YOUNG, WHITE MYTHOLOGIES: WRITING HISTORY AND THE WEST (1995); Dipesh Chakrabarty,

Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for 'Indian' Pasts?, 37 REPRESENTATIONS 1
(1992); Michel de Certeau, The HistoriographicalOperation, in THE WRITING OF HISTORY (Tom

Conley trans., 1988); Asis Nandy, History's ForgottenDoubles, 34 HIST. & THEORY 44 (1995).
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prior to appropriation through labor, neither the reception from
God, the holding, nor the fact of its being common has any individual, social, or political significance.
For Mehta, by divesting a nature given and held in common of
any emotive force, classical liberalism blocks an important moment
of commonness from furnishing a sense of collectivity, and thus
being a collective experience. The rendering of nature, and the
encounter with it, sentimentally inert, denies locational attachments as having any significance in relation to political identity.
Imagining nature as a physically and emotionally vacant space, with
no binding potential, makes it conceptually difficult to articulate
the origins and continued existence of distinct political societies
having territorial boundaries.
This posture lends itself to the denial of any distinct political
community of the colonized on account of their living in a distinct
physical space. Mehta's position is that territorial boundaries of
societies "reflect a distinct cognitive or emotional reality of their
members in which the physical considerations demarcate a positive
collective identification., 62 The liberal inability to acknowledge a
mutually constitutive relationship between bounded territory and
polity precludes recognition of Indians as a distinct political community; a recognition that would open up questions of autonomy
and self-governance, thus challenging the validity of imperialism.
Mehta compares liberalism's engagement with imperialism to
the posture adopted by Burke. He shows how Burke saw through
the abusive distortions of civilizational hierarchies, racial superiority, and assumptions of cultural impoverishment by which British
power justified its empire. Burke's consciousness that racial prejudice always lurked around the colonial question is evidenced by his
comment about his unremitting intensity on Indian matters, that "I
know what I am doing; whether the white people like it or not."6 3
For Burke, the existence of political society does not turn exclusively on such individual capacities as reason, will, and the ability to
choose, but also on the presence of a certain order on the ground.
Rejecting the centrality of consent, Burke contends that inheritances are in some crucial measure involuntary and that they bind
MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 131.
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us through the inescapable mediation of location and past. This
permits him to see political society and order in India, not just the
prospect of it through tutored development. This leads Mehta to
argue that "India's potential nationhood
was evident to [Burke]
64
centuries before it was to most Indians."

Mehta notes that Burke was not only concerned with the destructive impact of colonialism on the colonies but also its corrosive and
corrupting affect on Britain itself. Here Mehta fails to explore the
extent to which Burke prefigures an increasing focus of postcolonial studies to examine the extent to which modem Europe
itself is a product of the colonial encounter between the West and
the rest. Mehta also leaves unexplored the question as to what extent Burke's position on colonialism was shaped by his Catholic
and Irish background.65 Mehta also compares liberal postulates of
time space with those of Mahatama Gandhi and nationalist forces
in the colonies. For Gandhi the question of civilization is purely
individualistic, turning on how human beings are able to follow the
dictates of their duty and morality. This conception of civilization
precludes reliance on stages of history or the tutelage of one people by the other.
Nationalism in the colonies repudiates the developmental chronology of imperialism, and displaces history by making culture and
geography the grounds for claims of political community and selfgovernance. Mehta's exposition of Gandhi's thought and the nationalist challenge to liberalism is too brief to be satisfying. But
given his primary agenda in this book, this brevity is understandable.
In the end, Mehta comes back to the central question of why
champions of liberalism so enthusiastically endorsed colonialism.
According to him, the key to this question is the response of liberal
theorists as they cast their gaze on an unfamiliar world whereby
they saw those experiences and forms of life as provisional. The
empire as liberals conceived it was premised on the idea that in the
face of this provisionality it was right, even obligatory, to seek to
complete that which was incomplete, and guide it to a higher plane
of reason and purposefulness. For Mehta, "[t]hat judgment of
MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE, supranote 6, at 163.
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and the interventions

in their lives that it permits - is the conceptual and normative
core of the liberal justification of empire."6 This posture Mehta
finds ultimately rooted in a fundamental orientation of modern
Western thought, "namely a desire to master and possess nature,
where nature was understood in the broadest sense as that which
was external to the mind." 67 Mehta finds liberalism to be a derivative discourse of this broader orientation, in which,
being part of that orientation is to share in a project, which projects
itself by anticipation onto an unbounded future. As an implication of this, every "present," whether individual or collective, is
judged and acquires its meaning by reference to the projection of
which it is understood to be a part. The primacy of the projection
subsumes both judgment and understanding. Whatever is the
freedom of thought or the internal freedom that the projection
stems from gets carried over into its conception of what is involved in understanding that which is, only nominally, still external. In this sense of the term, understanding is tied to the project
from the outset. It therefore, in a strict sense, lacks the potential
to surprise. Similarly, the projection subsumes the "present" as a
specific, and not as a singular, halting moment, in which the
"present is not a transition, but one in which time stands still and
has come to a stop," where, as it were, the "'state of emergency' in
which we live is not the exception but the rule." In this project the
experiences of those who are, or remain, unfamiliar - of those
whose "present," whose life forms, are not deemed to be already
aligned along the anticipated axis of the projection - must necessarily be viewed as provisional; provisionality being the term
through which an uncertain and unfamiliar encounter gets
mapped onto a plain of temporal and categorical familiarity. For
those in that condition there is no Fetzt-Zeit, no time of the present, no singular experience in which the Day of Judgment is the
normal condition of history - only an infinite future. Within
this project man was made for the infinite. 68
In contrast to the liberal posture, Mehta articulates an attitude,
one he assigns to Burke, for "a conversation across boundaries of
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strangeness," and terms it "a posture of imaginative humility."
This posture "accepts that there is no shortcut around the messiness of communication, no immanent truth on which words can
fix, no easy glossaries of translation; instead, just the richness or
paucity of the vocabularies we use to describe ourselves and those
we are trying to understand." ° As critical legal scholars negotiate
traces of past oppressions in legal terrains of today in search of
peace, justice and dignity, this posture of imaginative humility may
come in very handy. In sites of post-colonial displacements and
multicultural hybridities, we must find modes of conversation and
deliberation in which the boundaries of what can be articulated are
never firmly established prior to the conversation. Only in such a
conversation, as Mehta contends, "power is denied space, and in
this sense the empire becomes an impossibility.""
Mehta's book would be very useful for a number of lines of inquiry in critical legal scholarship. It suggests fruitful lines of inquiry with regards to the relative exclusion or marginalization of
groups based on gender, race, class, sexuality or culture in formally
liberal democratic legal orders. It alerts us to possible contradictions at the very heart of apparently coherent worldviews and prescriptions for sustainable collective life. Most importantly, by highlighting the intersections of modernity and the colonial encounter,
Mehta underscores the need to situate and examine modern legal
history on a global plane. This should encourage us to uncover
traces of time, place and circumstances in the modern construction of the reasonable person as the only legitimate legal subject.
Imaginative humility would warrant against taking the history of
the world as an appendage to the history of modern Europe. Instead, we should endeavor to recover voices and choices erased by
the colonial encounter. Colonialism brought into sharp relief
many fundamental contradictions inherent in projects of modernity and the way universal claims are often bound up in particularistic assertions. And as post-colonial studies teaches us, the colonial encounter is not simply a thing of the past; it remains embedded in the conceptual constructs, disciplinary regimes and prejudices it engendered. As legal scholars our contribution to antisubordination struggles must include unveiling the colonial lineage of

Id. at 216.
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many hegemonic legal ideas and practices of today. Bringing this
lineage in sharper relief will give us a better purchase over strategies of resistance, recovery and representation. As global projects
of neo-liberal restructuring, "humanitarian" intervention, harmonization of legal regimes and delegation of sovereignty march
ahead amid assertions of the end of history and triumph of liberalism, we would do well to remember the disjunction between the
theory and history of liberalism. Mehta's book should help us do
just that.

